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has a negative effect across all non-tradable cities, which lose population and land value. 
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1. Introduction
The benefits of globalisation for consumers are spread widely across income groups and 
regions in a country, but the production impact is concentrated on particular sectors and 
firms.  This sectoral concentration maps into differential impacts on towns and cities, as well 
as on skill types.  Adjustment to such spatially concentrated shocks seems, from the 
experience of many countries, to be particularly difficult.  Cities in the rustbelt of the US or 
former manufacturing areas in the north of the UK and northern France have spent decades in 
relative, and sometimes absolute, decline.  The more recent experience of the China trade 
shock has been mapped into regional impacts, in particular by the work of Autor et al. (for a 
survey see Autor et al. 2016).  In this work adjustment failure is viewed as a consequence of 
labour market rigidities, typically a combination of inadequate labour mobility and/or wage 
flexibility, leading to an outcome with persistently low levels of employment in affected 
areas.1   
This paper explores a different mechanism through which trade or technology shocks create 
persistent regional and urban inequalities.  We assume a perfectly functioning labour market 
– with factor mobility and wage flexibility – and focus on the difficulties faced in
establishing new tradable sectors in cities that have lost a traditional tradable goods sector.  
The difficulties arise as many of these sectors are subject to agglomeration economies that 
create a first-mover problem; in the absence of coordinated behaviour, it is not profitable to 
start a new activity in a new place.  This problem is compounded by the fact that, within a 
country, factor mobility limits the magnitude of spatial wage variation meaning that costs do 
not fall enough to attract activity into a place that has experienced a negative shock.  In short, 
the usual mechanisms of comparative advantage do not operate to draw activity into an 
adversely affected area. 
We show circumstances under which trade shocks – positive as well as negative – lead to a 
polarisation of the urban structure as some cities boom and others decline.  Declining cities 
maintain economic activity, but it is in sectors producing non-tradable goods and services.  
As an increasing number of cities are relegated to specialising in these sectors the relative 
price of non-tradables declines, amplifying the gap between cities.  The counterpart of cities 
that have lost tradable sectors are booming cities that have retained tradable goods or service 
sectors.  These expand, driving up land prices in these cities and possibly also the share of 
rent in income (actual and imputed to land and property owners). These booming cities are as 
1  Research on the impact of trade on regional and urban performance is reviewed by Autor et al. 
(2016) including their influential work on the impact of Chinese competition on the US labour 
market.  Variation in regional exposure to import competition (via the industrial structure of the 
region) is used to establish the negative impact of this competition on manufacturing employment and 
consequent higher unemployment in the US (Autor et al. 2016) and Norway (Balsvik et al. 2017).  In 
Spain the response has been higher employment in other sectors (Donoso et al. 2014). 
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much a feature of trade shocks as are declining cities that have lost competiveness in tradable 
goods production.2    
The paper presents a simple model of this process, combining elements of urban economics 
and international trade. At the heart of the model are three features.  The first is the presence 
of agglomeration economies, i.e. external economies of scale, operating at the city or region 
level and within a particular productive sector (localisation economies).  It is this that gives 
rise to spatial clustering of sectors, meaning that different cities within a country will 
undertake different economic activities and that trade shocks will impact different areas in 
different ways.  The model assumes that all tradable sectors are subject to these economies, 
although non-tradable sectors are not.  A further consequence of agglomeration economies is 
that it is difficult to establish new centres of production for tradable goods.  A city that has 
lost a traditional sector offers neither low enough factor prices nor any productivity 
advantage in a new sector.  Coordinated action by firms – or a ‘large developer’ – can solve 
the problem, but without this no firm wants to be the first in the sector to establish in a new 
location, uncertain as to whether it will be followed by other firms which will create the 
cluster and raise productivity.  
The second feature is that we distinguish between tradable and non-tradable sectors, where by 
non-tradables we mean goods produced for the national rather than the international 
economy, and hence have their price set domestically rather than fixed at world prices.3 A 
central feature of the model is that cities in a country will divide between those producing 
tradables and those producing non-tradables. Trade shocks may cause cities to switch activity 
with, for example, cities that lose their tradable sector due to import competition defaulting to 
non-tradable production.    
The third feature is that, within a country, the performance of a city depends largely on its 
absolute advantage, not its comparative advantage.  If a country’s export sector has a negative 
shock the adjustment mechanism is a real depreciation, i.e. a reduction in its wage and unit 
costs relative to its trading partners, and this reduction continues until other sectors become 
competitive.  If a city within a country suffers a negative shock there may be little flexibility 
of relative wages between regions because factor mobility means that labour markets are 
tightly integrated. Of course, there are some immobile factors, such as land and houses. Their 
prices will fall in the adversely affected region but since these factors only represent a small 
fraction of costs they have little leverage in bringing other sectors to the point of 
                                                 
2  This has evidently been a dramatic feature of the US and UK economies.  See Moretti (2013) for a 
discussion of the issues, and Florida (2017) for US experience of booming cities. 
3  It would be possible, but not qualitatively interesting, to add truly local non-tradables (haircuts, 
restaurants), just serving the local city market. 
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competitiveness.4  This will be particularly the case in the presence of localisation economies 
and coordination failure.   
Model essentials are set out in simple form in section 2 and the core of the paper is section 3 
which looks at the adjustment of the economy to trade shocks.  A novelty of the paper is that 
the equilibrium division of cities between tradable and non-tradable is not unique.  In the full 
model of section 3 trade shocks shift the equilibrium set, so their impact depends on the 
economy’s initial point in this set, i.e. the initial division of cities between tradable and non-
tradable production.  In a wide range of cases we show that sufficiently large shocks – both 
negative and positive – will have the effect of knocking out some established centres of 
tradable activity and thereby increasing the number of cities producing only non-tradables.  
We maintain the assumption of full employment but show how switching between activities 
impacts the entire economy, changing the size distribution of cities and the distribution of 
income. Cities that retain tradable goods sectors boom and per capita income in the economy 
may rise.  However, the principal beneficiaries are property owners in the booming cities and, 
depending on the initial position, the share of rent in national income may increase.  
 
2.  Tradable and non-tradable cities.   
2.1 The model: 
A small open economy contains an exogenously determined number of cities, M, in which all 
production takes place.  We assume in this section that the economy is endowed with a single 
factor of production, labour in quantity L, and that there are two types of productive sectors, 
tradable and non-tradable.  In the following section we give the two factor (i.e. two skill 
level) and three productive sector version.   
Labour is mobile between cities, and each city has a geographical structure of the usual 
Alonso-Mills-Muth form, in which jobs are located in the central business district (CBD), 
workers occupy residential land, commuting is costly, and land rent adjusts to make workers 
indifferent between residential locations. Cities can potentially produce either non-tradable 
goods, becoming a ‘type-N’ city, or tradables, becoming ‘type-T’.  Non-tradables are freely 
traded within the country, but not internationally; they can be thought of as some food 
sectors, retail and wholesale trade, distribution, customer service centres, and national 
financial, professional, personal and government services.  They are produced under constant 
returns to scale, and their price is set on the national market.  Tradable goods are freely 
tradable globally at fixed world prices and are subject to city specific agglomeration 
                                                 
4  Although price adjustment of immobile factors generally cannot induce a real depreciation that 
fully offsets a negative shock it can slow down the movement of mobile factors, as argued by Glaeser 
and Gyourko (2005).     
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economies.  Tradables can be thought of as a number of different goods or sectors, but all are 
symmetric and price-taking, and the key point is the city specificity of agglomeration (or 
localisation) economies.5  This ensures that each city will specialise, being either type-T 
(specialising in a single tradable sector), or type-N (producing only non-tradables). The 
number of type-T cities is endogenous and denoted TM , and the remainder are type-N, 
producing non-tradables (MN = M – MT).
6   
The price of tradables is pT, exogenously fixed at the world level, and the number of workers 
employed in each type-T city is denoted LT .  Localisation economies mean that productivity, 
q, in each of these cities is increasing in the level of employment in the city, 0)(' TLq .  
Labour is the only input to production, so the wage is value productivity,  
)( TTT Lqpw   .         (1) 
Employment in type-N cities is NL  and the wage is Nw .  Non-tradables are, by definition, 
tradable within the country but not abroad, so their price, Np , is determined at the national 
level.  We assume that one unit of labour produces one unit of non–tradable output, implying 
NN wp  . The price (and hence wage) of non-tradables is determined by market clearing 
condition 
   NNTTTTNNT LwMMLwMwLMM )()(   .               (2) 
The left hand side is the value of supply of non-tradables, and the right hand side is the value 
of demand, where the term in square brackets is total income and θ is the share of income 
spent on non-tradables.  This share is derived from assuming that all expenditure in each city 
goes on a composite good,7 which is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of tradables and non-
tradables with price index  NT wpP
 1 .  We take tradable goods as the numeraire, so 1Tp  
and the price index of the composite good is 

NwP  .            (3) 
Workers’ per capita utility in a city of type-i is   iiiii bLPwPbPLwu  // .  The term in 
brackets is the wage net of urban costs, these consisting of commuting and rent payments.  
These urban costs increase with city population iL at rate b and are incurred in units of the 
                                                 
5  In section 3 the assumption of symmetry of all type-T cities is relaxed, allowing there to be two 
types.  A more general approach would be to have differences in the scale of each tradable goods 
sector and hence each tradable city, in the style of Henderson (1974).   
6 Venables (2017) analyses the issues faced by a single developing country city with non-tradable 
production and which is seeking to establish a tradable goods sector. 
7  This is final household expenditure net of rents and commuting costs, spending by recipients of rent 
income, and commuting costs which are incurred in units of the composite good.  
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composite good with price index P.  Expenditure net of urban costs goes on the composite 
good, so utility is spending net of urban costs deflated by the price index.  Labour mobility 
equalises utility across all cities so  
  NNTT bLPwbLPw  // .        (4) 
Thus, larger cities have to pay a higher nominal wage in order to offset the higher costs of 
rent and commuting.  Finally, national labour market clearing is  
NTTT LMMLML )(  .        (5) 
Equilibrium conditional on the number of type-T cities, TM , is the solution of the five 
equations above for endogenous variables  PLLww NTNT ,,,, .  
The ‘urban costs’ of a particular worker are divided between commuting costs and land rent 
according to her residential location relative to the centre of the city.8  For the edge worker 
they are entirely commuting costs and for a worker adjacent to the CBD they are entirely 
rent.  If the city is linear and commuting costs are linear in distance then, since the 
commuting cost paid by the marginal worker (living at the city edge) is ibPL , (i = T, N), the 
total of commuting costs and rent city wide is 2ibPL . Total commuting costs are half this, 
2/2ibPL , the remainder being rent.  For consistency with eqn. (2) we require that rents are 
spent on the composite good so real rents (deflated by the price of the composite good) are 
2/2ii bLR  .  Notice that total real rents are increasing and convex in city size.  The quadratic 
form comes from our assumptions of a linear city with linear commuting costs, but convexity 
is a much more general property as large cities have both more land and higher average rent.9  
The total utility generated by a city of type i is the real income of workers plus real land rents, 
iii RLu  .   
2.2: Equilibria: 
Fig. 1 traces out values of variables solving eqns. (1) – (5) as a function of TM , with the 
horizontal axis giving the proportion of cities that are type-T and the vertical giving wages.  
The figure is constructed with 1)0( q ,  q’ > 0 and with θ = ½, ensuring the existence of an 
                                                 
8  For detailed exposition of the Alonso-Muth-Mills model of urban land-use see Duranton and Puga 
(2015). 
9 In a more general setting, edge commuting costs are 1ibPL , average commuting costs 
 /ibPL , 
total land rent   /)1( ii PLbR  .  In a linear city γ = 2, and in a circular city γ = 3/2.  The 
condition γ > 1 is necessary for edge commuting costs to be increasing with city size (see Henderson 
and Venables 2009). 
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equilibrium with an equal number of cities of each type. Other parameter values are given in 
the appendix.  
The market clearing price of non-tradables is Nw , increasing in the number of cities of type-T 
since this corresponds to fewer type-N cities and therefore less non-tradable supply.  A higher 
(nominal) wage Nw  attracts migrants, raising urban costs in type-N cities.  To continue to 
equalise utilities across city types (eqn. 4) there must be a decrease in the size of type-T 
cities; this means lower agglomeration economies and hence the downward sloping wage 
curve )( TTT Lqpw  .
10  Finally, the horizontal line on the figure, )0(qpT , is the wage that 
could be paid by a single (small) firm that sought to produce tradable goods in a type-N city, 
and therefore without the productivity advantage of localisation economies. 
What is the equilibrium number of cities of each type?  Points to the left of Tmin cannot be an 
equilibrium since, with )0(qpw TN  , it would be profitable for firms in type-N cities to 
commence tradable production.   Points to the right of Tmax cannot be an equilibrium since, 
with NNT pww  , firms in type-T cities would switch to producing non-tradables.  Any 
value of TM  in the interval [Tmin , Tmax ] is an equilibrium, since no firm in any city has an 
incentive to switch sector.   
The finite size interval [Tmin , Tmax ] and associated set of equilibria exists because of 
agglomeration economies and coordination failure.  The vertical gap )0()( qpLqp TTT   
captures the obstacle faced by a single firm in a type-N city that chooses to produce tradables 
(with productivity )0(q ) and has to compete with tradable producers in type-T cities (with 
productivity )( TLq ).   Absent coordination failure, the equilibrium would be at point the 
unique point S, the intersection )( TTTN Lqpww  , with wages, city size and rent the same 
in all cities.  In the example illustrated agglomeration economies are quite modest.  At Tmin 
productivity )( TLq is 25% higher than )0(q , but even this modest level of agglomeration 
economies supports the wide range of equilibria illustrated.  In this interval nominal wages 
are higher in type-T cities than in type-N, NT ww  , more so the fewer tradable cities there 
are.  The price index P is the same everywhere, so migration equilibrium is supported by 
type-T cities having higher urban costs, i.e. being larger.  Larger size means higher 
commuting costs for the marginal worker, and higher rents and land values on land at each 
distance.  This is illustrated on fig. 2, giving total real rents in each city.  At Tmin  total city  
rents are 4.1 times larger in type-T cities than in type-N cities, this being made up of average 
rents per person (and per unit land) being 2.02 times higher, and city population 2.03 times 
greater.    
                                                 




Figure 1:  Wages, productivity and equilibria 
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2.3: Trade shocks: 
How does this economy respond to a shock that impacts a traded good sector?  The shock 
could be either trade or technology, and we suppose (in this section) that it simply removes 
the country’s comparative advantage in some of its tradable sectors and hence in some of its 
type-T cities.    Coordination failure means that these cities cannot easily switch to a new T-
sector, so instead become type-N cities.  On figs. 1 and 2 this corresponds to movement to the 
left so, if the economy is initially at Tmax, then type-T and type-N cities each follow the paths 
indicated by the arrows.  As type-T cities default to being type-N cities, so the price of non-
tradables falls, dragging down nominal wages in all type-N cities.  They lose population to 
remaining type-T cities and – since real wages are equated by migration – this leads to falling 
rents in all type-N cities and rising rents and land prices in type-T cities (Fig. 2).   
Real income effects are shown in Fig. 3.  Total real rent (bottom line, expressed per worker) 
is minimised at the point where rents earned in each city are the same.  This is where cities 
are the same size and is the equilibrium without coordination failure, point S; by convexity of 
rents in city size, moving away from this point in either direction raises total real rent.  Total 
utility (top line) is decreasing with the number of type-T cities throughout the equilibrium 
range, and is slightly (1.4%) higher at Tmin than at Tmax. This surprising result (and the 
implication that the point without coordination failure, S on Fig. 1, is inefficient) comes from 
the fact that remaining type-T cities are larger the smaller is MT, so the economy is achieving 
greater economies of scale.  (If the productivity gap )0()( qLq T   were constant for all 
0TL then total utility would be maximised at S where T = Tmax).  Reducing the number of 
type-T cities reduces worker’s utility relative to rents throughout the equilibrium range, but 
fuller exploitation of economies of scale enables an absolute increase over part of the range.  
In summary, a negative shock with direct effect on a single city gives the following 
equilibrium effects.  This city defaults to non-tradable production meaning that the adverse 
consequences are felt across all N-cities which experience falling nominal wages, population 
loss and falling real rents.  Remaining tradable cities boom, gaining population and nominal 
wage increases.  However, the largest part of the gain is captured by those fortunate enough 
to own land in these remaining tradable cities. 
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3.  Trade shocks, skills and cities.   
The model of the previous section focuses on the domestic economy and enables a few points 
to be made in a simple fashion.  However, it does not contain a full model of trade and its 
wider impact on the economy.  We now add this, modelling the trade shock as a change in 
world prices faced by the country. 
3.1:  The model 
We now assume that there are two types of tradable sectors, A and B, and model the trade 
shock as an increase in the world price of products in type-A sectors.11  As before, tradable 
sectors have localisation economies, so cities will specialise in a particular sector, giving 
cities of type-A, B, N;  subscripts denote city-type so, for example, xi, is output in a city of 
type i = A, B, N.  There are two factors of production which we think of as two labour skill 
levels, and we assume that the three sectors, A, B and N have different factor intensities.  
Changes in prices of tradable goods then lead directly to changes in factor prices through 
Stolper-Samuelson effects, although different in detail because of increasing returns to scale 
                                                 
11  In the simulations that follow we assume that products and sectors are otherwise symmetric and 
that the initial equilibrium is symmetric.  It follows that there is (locally) no trade and no terms of 
trade effect.    
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in the tradable cities. All products are consumed domestically so price changes have a direct 
impact on the price index, P, as well as changing the structure of production in the economy.   
The formal structure of the model is as follows.  Production functions in the three sectors are 
),( NNNN KLXx  ,         ),()( TTTTT KLXxqx  ,    T = A, B,  (6) 
where )( Txq  captures localisation economies in the tradable cities, 0)(' Txq , and the two 
factors (labour skills) are denoted L, K.  Factor demands are implicitly derived from marginal 
value products, where Tp , T = A, B are the prices of the two types of tradables and w and r 












































)( ,    T = A, B.  
The price of non-traded goods comes from market clearing equation 
 NNBABBBAAANNBA xpMMMxpMxpMxpMMM )()(   . (8) 
hence    ))(1/( BABBBAAANN MMMxpMxpMxp   . 
The composite good is made up both types of tradable and the non-tradables, according to 
BA
BAN pppP
 ,  with 1 BA  . 
We assume that urban costs increase in the number of workers, simply adding the two types 
of labour.  The utilities of workers of type L, K in city of type i are therefore  
)(/ iii
L
i KLbPwu  ,  )(/ iii
K
i KLbPru  , i = A, B, N.   For each type of worker 
mobility equalises utility across cities, so  
)(/)(/ TTTNNN KLbPwKLbPw  ,      T = A, B.   (9) 
)(/)(/ TTTNNN KLbPrKLbPr  ,       T = A, B. 
Factor market clearing equations are 
NBABBAA LMMMLMLML )(  ,       (10) 
NBABBAA KMMMKMKMK )(  .  
                                                 
12  Firms do not internalise localisation economies in their hiring decisions, so )( Txq  is assumed 
constant in derivation of marginal products.  
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Equilibrium conditional on the number of cities in the tradable sectors, BA MM , , is the 
solution of the above equations for output, factor prices, factor allocation to cities and the 
price of non-tradables.   
We assume that all workers – skilled and unskilled, and at all locations – occupy the same 
amount of land and, as before, urban costs are derived from commuting costs which total  
  2/2 PKLb ii  , and rents   2/
2
PKLb ii  , so that real rents are   2/
2
iii KLbR  , i = A, 





ii RKuLuU  ,      i = A, B, N.        (11) 
3.2:  Equilibria: 
As in section 2, localisation economies and coordination failure create a set of equilibria.  
This is the set of city combinations, },,{ BANBA MMMMMM   at which no deviation 
by a worker or single (small) firm is profitable.  If cost functions dual to production functions 
iX are denoted )(Jci where (J) represents evaluation at the factor prices of a city of type J = 
A, B, N then the equilibrium set of city locations meet the following conditions:   
 )(),()( BcAcNcp NNNN  ,     )0(/)(),0(/)()(/)( AAAAAAAA qNcqBcxqAcp  , 
 )0(/)(),0(/)()(/)( ABBBBBBB qNcqAcxqBcp  .    (12) 
Thus, looking at the last of these, )(/)( BBB xqBc  is the unit cost of producing sector-B goods 
at type-B city factor prices and output scale (hence productivity )( BB xq ).  At an equilibrium 
it must be the case that this equals the price Bp  and is (weakly) less than the unit cost of 
producing sector-B goods in cities of type-A and N, given their factor prices and the fact that 
they have no agglomeration economies received from sector-B production.  
The equilibrium set of city combinations is illustrated on Fig. 4, which has numbers of type-
A and type-B cities on the axes (so the number of non-tradable cities follows from 
BAN MMMM  ).   The figure is constructed for a symmetric example in which 
consumption shares for the 3 types of goods are the same 3/1 BA  ,  national 
endowments of the two factors are equal, and production functions are Cobb-Douglas, with 
and the same returns to scale in each of the tradable sectors, A, B (see appendix).  L shares in 
each sector are 75.0,5.0,25.0  BNA  , i.e. sector A is the most skill intensive, 
followed by non-tradables with sector B least skill intensive.  Prices of tradables are 
1 BA pp .  The lozenge shaped area is the equilibrium set, i.e. the set of values 
12 
 
},,{ NBA MMM  that satisfy inequalities (12).
13  Point S is the equilibrium without 
coordination failure, and elsewhere in the set the obstacles to entry created by coordination 
failure gives a smaller total number of tradable cities, BA MM  , and larger number of non-
tradable.   
 




The edges of the lozenge define points at which different sectors are equi-profitable in cities 
of a particular type.  To be precise, the boundaries are:   
 East boundary:  exit type-B:      )(/)( BBBB xqBcp  ,  )(Bcp NN  . 
 West boundary: entry type-B:   )(Ncp NN  ,  )0(/)( BBB qNcp  . 
 North boundary: exit type-A:    )(/)( AAAA xqAcp  ,  )(Acp NN  . 
 South boundary: entry type-A: )(Ncp NN  ,   )0(/)( AAA qNcp  . 
                                                 
13  The formal definition of a lozenge is a rhombus with acute angles of less than 45o.   The word is  




















Thus, on the east boundary factor prices and productivity in a type-B city are such that price 
equals unit cost in type-B production; additionally, the prevailing price of non-tradables is 
equal to the unit cost of non-tradable production at type-B city factor prices. Crossing this 
boundary (leaving the lozenge) sector-B production becomes unprofitable and the city 
switches to non-tradables, hence the label ‘exit-B’.  On the west boundary factor prices in a 
type-N city are such that, as well as )(Ncp NN  , unit cost in type-B production equals price 
Bp , even in the absence of any type-B production (i.e. with productivity )0(Bq ).  Crossing 
this boundary (entering the lozenge) would cause a type-N city to switch to type-B, hence the 
label ‘entry-B’.  The boundaries are slightly convex, not straight lines as they may appear to 
be in the figure.   
At point S, in this symmetric case, all cities are the same size and have the same rents.  
Moving away from this point city sizes and rents change,  and the arrows indicate directions 
in which rents of each city type are increasing most sharply (they are normals to iso-rent 
contours through S).  Thus, moving along the 45o ray from the origin towards S increases 
rents in each non-tradable city, NR ; along this ray there are fewer type-N cities but they are 
larger and hence have higher rents.  Moving to the west reduces the number of type-B cities, 
increasing their size and hence increasing rents, as indicated by arrow BR .  Responses in 
type-A cities mirror this.  Changes in the number and size of cities change the output of each 
sector, so an increase in BM  and associated reduction in Bx  has a net positive effect on total 
sector-B output, BBxM .  It follows that the economy is an exporter of sector-B east of the 45
o 
line, and an importer to the west.   
Maintaining the assumption of symmetry, the shape of the lozenge depends on parameter 
values in the following way.  More similar labour shares, BA  , ,  leave points on 45
o line 
unchanged, while the north-west and south-east vertices are stretched out, creating a superset 
of the lozenge illustrated.  In the limit, with equal labour shares, the equilibrium set is the 
area between two parallel lines through the two vertices on the 45o line.  Greater increasing 
returns shift the south and west frontiers respectively down and the left, leaving point S 
unchanged and extending the length of the north and east boundaries, again creating a 
superset of the lozenge illustrated.  Reducing increasing returns has the opposite effect, in the 
limit (constant returns to scale) reducing the equilibrium to point S.  Varying urban 
commuting costs, c, is qualitatively similar, with higher costs reducing the size of the 






3.3:  Trade shocks  
We model globalisation as a fall in the world price ratio
AB pp / .  The change is exogenous, 
and is due to either a supply or demand shock in the rest of the world.  It could take the form 
of either a fall in Bp or increase in Ap , depending on choice of numeraire. The relative price 
change shifts the equilibrium set up and to the left as illustrated by the bold arrow in Fig. 5 
(illustrated for a change from 1/ AB pp  to 8.0/ AB pp ) giving the new lozenge, 
overlapping with the original.  We start the analysis by assuming that the initial equilibrium is 
at point S, and then look at the implications of different initial positions.  
Without coordination failure the equilibrium would shift from S to point S^, with type-B 
cities switching costlessly to become type-A.  But coordination failure means that conversion 
to type-A cities does not occur; it is not profitable for any firm to start type-A activity in a 
city specialised in type-B or N. There is instead horizontal movement, so starting at S the 
equilibrium moves towards S* as type-B cities default to becoming type-N.  It is helpful to 
think of this as a continuous process of change.  As the lozenge starts to move north-west so 
point S ceases to be an equilibrium because B-production makes a loss and N-production 
becomes profitable.  The equilibrium is dragged to the west by the exit-B boundary of the 
lozenge. 
Figure 6 maps out the changes in city numbers and in rent, plotting the number of cities of 
each type (horizontal axis) and the rent each city earns (vertical axis).  In the initial 
symmetric position there are the same numbers of cities of each type, and all have the same 
total rent.  Other points give outcomes reached with AB pp /  reduced from unity to 0.8.  
Points {A^, B^, N^} are points without coordination failure.  City sizes and rents are 
unchanged and type-B cities have simply developed type-A sectors.  Points {A*, B*, N*} are 
points with coordination failure (corresponding to S* on fig. 5).  The number of type-A cities 
remains constant, while some type-B cities switch to non-tradable production.   These 
changes are accompanied by changes in rents and city sizes (with sizes growing as the square 
root of rents).   Rents in type-A cities increase by 126%, while those in remaining type-B 
cities fall by 43%.  The number of type-N cities increases causing the price of non-tradables 
to fall, shrinking all such cities and reducing their rents by 26%.  Total real rents across all 








Figure 6:  Globalisation and city specialisation: initial equilibrium at S 
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There are also changes in the wage of each type of labour, with an increase in wages of 
skilled labour (intensive in sector-A) and fall in wage of unskilled. These are driven by 
Stolper-Samuelson effects, although modified by the productivity effects of changing city 
size.  The wage effects are smaller in the presence of coordination failure (point S* compared 
to S^).  The reason comes from assumed factor intensities.  Absent coordination failure, 
workers leaving the most unskilled intensive sector (B) are re-employed in the most skilled 
intensive sector (A).  With coordination failure this sector expands less (entirely within, 
rather than across cities), while the non-tradable sector grows.  This has intermediate skill 
intensity, so is able to re-employ dislocated unskilled labour with small general equilibrium 
price change.  There is a small (approximately 2%) increase in aggregate real income in 
moving to either S* or S^, this driven largely by a terms of trade improvement.14 
Finally, we re-emphasise that these changes are driven by a fall in relative price, AB pp / , i.e. 
by any combination of a fall in the price of type-B or an increase price of type-A goods.  
Formally, this is simply a choice of numeraire.  Intuitively, type-B cities can be damaged 
either by a lower price of their output, or by expanding type-A cities pulling in labour and 
increasing factor prices.  Thus, the financial sector in the City of London has a ‘Dutch 
disease’ effect on the rest of the UK. 
Initial positions:  Any point in the lozenge is an equilibrium, but analysis so far has been 
based on starting at the point of no coordination failure.  What happens more generally? The 
initial lozenge in Fig. 5 is divided into zones I, II, III and we discuss each in turn. 
Starting from a point in the upper part of zone I, effects are similar to movement from point 
S.  While initial city sizes are different, the trade shock causes some cities to switch from 
type-B to type-N and the number of type-A cities is unchanged.  However, in the lower part 
of zone I horizontal movement encounters the bottom vertex of the moving lozenge.  A path 
of continuous change is shown on Fig. 5 by the kinked arrow with origin Y.  Initially city 
specialisations are dragged by the ‘Exit-B’ boundary, switching from type-B to type-N, 
(horizontal movement on fig. 5), but at some point this movement will coincide with the 
south-east vertex of the lozenge.  Beyond that point the equilibrium is dragged along by the 
vertex, moving up the dashed line.  Some type-B cities switch to become type-N, and others 
become type-A.   Fig. 7 gives the evolution of city numbers and city rents on this path.  The 
initial point is asymmetric, with city numbers and rents labelled A, B, N on Fig. 7; thus, there 
are few type-A cities but they are large, with high rent. Small reductions in AB pp /  cause 
                                                 
14 The starting point is a symmetric equilibrium with zero trade and hence no terms of trade effect in 
the neighbourhood of 1/ AB pp .  Moving away from this point the country becomes an exporter of 
type-A goods and importer of type-B, so further reductions in AB pp / bring terms of trade gains and 




movements along the solid lines; the number of type-A cities is unchanged (their size and 
rents increasing), and type-B cities to default to type-N.  Beyond the kink (dashed line) type-
B firms continue to exit, but most switch to type-A production, and a few to type-N.  
Essentially, the initial point with few type-A cities has relatively lower skilled wages so, as 
AB pp /  falls it becomes profitable to initiate type-A activity in what was previously a type-B 
city.  However, the story remains one of urban polarisation.  The cities that grow are those 
that were initially large (high rent); non-tradable cities start small, and as their number 
increases they become smaller and lower rent. 
 




In zone II the effect of the price change is (initially) to cause type-N cities to switch to type-
A, i.e. there is vertical movement as the entry-A barrier shifts the equilibrium. The reason 
follows from our assumed factor intensity of different activities.  The initial situation has very 
few type-A cities so has relatively low skilled wages. The increase in the price of Ap  relative 
to Bp  (and also to Np ) makes the switch profitable.  Notice that if the initial point is near the 
south-east vertex then upwards movement becomes, at some point, movement along the 
dashed line with type-A activity replacing a combination of type-B and type-N.    
Finally, zone III. If the initial position is in this area then, for the 20% relative price change 
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on which Fig. 5 is based, no city changes specialisation; points in zone III are in both the 
initial and the final lozenge. City sizes do change, and in this region the story is one of 
convergence.  There are relatively many type-A cities which are relatively small, but grow as 
price
Ap  increases relative to Bp . 
 
4.  Conclusions and implications 
The spatial economy is replete with market failures that make adjustment to change difficult 
while, in contrast, much international economics has put naive faith in adjustment occurring 
because ‘everywhere has a comparative advantage’.  The latter statement is true, but 
irrelevant in an integrated economy.  It becomes positively misleading if there are barriers to 
starting activities in new places, such as those created by localisation economies and 
coordination failure.  This paper makes a small step towards setting up a framework where 
spatial and international economics combine in a way that recognises the inability of markets 
to secure satisfactory adjustment to some of the economic shocks witnessed in recent years. 
As recent political events have made clear, research needs to take many further steps down 
this path.  
The core of the economic problem is that the market mechanism does not create sufficient 
incentives to start new tradable activities (or more generally, new activities that can achieve 
high productivity through agglomeration economies and increasing returns to scale) in places 
that have lost historic specialisms.  What can start such activities? 
One possibility is based on innovation.  If the economy is creating new activities, not linked 
to existing agglomerations, then it is possible that they start up in relatively low cost ‘type-N’ 
places. This route is emphasised in Moretti (2013), and exemplified by Seattle.  In the 1970s 
Seattle was a city with a declining port and manufacturing sector, unemployment twice the 
US national average, losing population and famous for the 1971 billboard saying ‘will the last 
person leaving Seattle turn out the lights’.  It has been transformed by the arrival of Microsoft 
and an associated cluster of firms.  Of course, the arrival of Microsoft from its initial base in 
Albuquerque was due to the fortuitous circumstance that both Bill Gates and Paul Allen had 
grown up in Seattle.  While the innovation route has been successful in transforming some 
cities, it is most unlikely that there are enough distinct new innovative clusters to populate the 
number of cities that have lost previous sectoral specialisms. 
A second route is to try and address the coordination failure by policy that targets particular 
places for economic development, possibly in specific sectors.  The simple economic theory 
suggests that ‘large developers’ may be able to internalise the externalities created by 
agglomeration, overcoming coordination failure by launching development at scale.  Public 
policy to support this may take the form of city plans and the location of infrastructure (e.g. 
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placement of transport hubs).  Special economic zones offer regulatory, fiscal, and 
infrastructure benefits, concentrated in one place with the hope of creating cluster benefits.  
Developing countries offer some successful example, such as Shenzhen, Dhaka, and Penang; 
however, there are many more failures. 15  Developed countries have used fiscal incentives in 
the form of regional investment or employment subsidies and subsidies to influence plant 
location decisions. A review of the success of these policies is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but existing reviews tend to the conclusion that, even if policies have had some impact, they 
have generally failed to jump-start new economic activities and trigger the development of 
self-sustaining private sector clusters (see e.g. Neumark and Simpson 2015, Moretti 2013).   
Perhaps one reason for this is that such policies may succeed in attracting non-tradable 
activities, moving public services or securing investments in warehousing or customer service 
centres (and may even be targeted at these sectors).  But this is simply to accelerate the 
unsatisfactory adjustment process described in this paper, dragging down incomes in all other 
non-tradable cities. 
A further option is to be willing to let towns and cities contract.  In a simple framework – 
such as that presented in this paper – this could be welfare improving, providing that 
booming cities are enabled to expand by constructing infrastructure and housing to mitigate 
effects on commuting costs, land prices and rents.  However, there are many further costs to 
such a policy, beyond those captured in such a simple model.  These are the costs of 
economic and social dislocation borne largely by those unable to move and trapped in a 
declining community. 
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Appendix 
Section 2 parameter values: L = 100, M = 100, θ = 1/2, b = 0.3, TT LLq 15.01)(  .  
Section 3 parameter values:  L = 50, K= 50, M = 100,  θA = θB = θN = 1/3,  b = 0.25,  
75.0,5.0,25.0  BNA  , ii xxq 1.01)(  , i = A, B.  
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